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Abstract   I argue that scientific realism, insofar as it is only committed to those 
scientific posits of which we have causal knowledge, is immune to Kyle Stanford’s 
argument from unconceived alternatives. This causal strategy (previously introduced, 
but not worked out in detail, by Anjan Chakravartty) is shown not to repeat the 
shortcomings of previous realist responses to Stanford’s argument. Furthermore, I 
show that the notion of causal knowledge underlying it can be made sufficiently 
precise by means of conceptual tools recently introduced into the debate on scientific 
realism. Finally, I apply this strategy to the case of Jean Perrin’s experimental work 
on the atomic hypothesis, disputing Stanford’s claim that the problem of unconceived 
alternatives invalidates a realist interpretation of this historical episode. 
1  Stanford’s Argument from Unconceived 
Alternatives 
Kyle Stanford (2006) argues against scientific realism by claiming that much of our 
scientific knowledge is subject to what he calls ‘the problem of unconceived 
alternatives’ (PUA). The importance of this problem lies in its detrimental effect on 
eliminative inferences, that is, inferences which proceed by formulating different 
hypotheses, testing them and, if only one of them survives all the tests, concluding 
that it must be true. As Stanford notes, such a procedure is only reliable ‘when we can 
be reasonably sure that we have considered all of the most likely, plausible, or 
reasonable alternatives before we proceed to eliminate all but one of them’ (2006, 
29). Therefore: 
(PUA) Many eliminative inferences in science are unreliable, because there are 
plausible and sufficiently distinct alternative hypotheses that are not taken into 
consideration.  
This formulation of the PUA is intended to show that Stanford is not attempting to 
undermine eliminative inference in general, but only some instances of it. The 
interesting question then is, of course, which instances these are. Stanford’s answer is 
that the PUA threatens ‘our efforts to theorize about the most fundamental aspects of 
the constitution and dynamics of the various domains of nature’ (2006, 33). In order 
to argue for this claim, he identifies in the historical record of fundamental theorizing 
a pattern of ‘recurrent, transient underdetermination’ (RTU) and then performs what 
he calls a ‘new induction’ (NI)1 so as to generalize from past theorizing to all 
(including present) theorizing. In more detail, the argument goes as follows: 
                                                           
1 By calling his argument a ‘new induction’, Stanford emphasizes the contrast (but 
also the connection) between his argument and the pessimistic (meta-) induction 
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(RTU) Past theorists failed to consider relevant and radically distinct alternatives 
to their own theories, namely the theories that came to be accepted in the 
course of later inquiry. These theories were plausible, since they were at least 
as well confirmed by the available evidence as the previous theories. This 
shows that past theorists were subject to the PUA in their fundamental 
theorizing.  
(NI) Since present theorists are not relevantly different from past theorists, it 
follows by induction that they, too, are subject to the PUA in their 
fundamental theorizing.  
The immediate consequence of (NI) is that realism about the claims of present 
fundamental theories should be rejected insofar as these claims result from 
eliminative inferences. Stanford (2006, chap. 8) thus advocates an epistemic 
instrumentalism with respect to these claims. 
Equipped with this rough sketch of Stanford’s argument, I will in the following 
section give an overview of the most important objections raised by his critics, 
grouping them according to which link of Stanford’s argumentative chain they are 
attacking. I cannot discuss these objections in detail, but I will highlight some of their 
shortcomings, in order to show that more work is required to refute Stanford’s 
argument. Section 3 then attempts to do the necessary work by fleshing out a 
response to Stanford’s challenge, based on the notion of causal knowledge. Finally, 
section 4 applies these considerations to a concrete case from the history of physics, 
on which Stanford has commented in some detail: Jean Perrin’s work on Brownian 
motion and the atomic hypothesis. 
2  Previous Attempts to Undermine the PUA 
Realist criticisms of Stanford’s reasoning fall into three camps. The first denies that 
the historical cases of unconceived alternatives mentioned in (RTU) are plausible in 
the relevant sense, the second denies that these alternatives are sufficiently distinct 
from the theories available at the time, and the third seeks to block the induction 
described in (NI) by pointing out differences between the past and the present 
development of science. I will discuss these three camps in turn, arguing that none of 
them has so far produced a completely convincing response to the PUA. 
2.1  The plausibility of unconceived alternatives 
Unconceived alternatives can only generate a problem for scientific realism if they 
have some plausibility. Stanford (2006, sec. 1.2) is therefore very careful to distance 
the PUA from what he calls ‘Cartesian fantasies’, that is, far-fetched sceptical 
scenarios which, if taken seriously, would call into question any knowledge claim 
whatsoever. One line of criticism against Stanford is that the notion of plausibility 
employed in (RTU) threatens to collapse this distinction between serious alternatives 
and sceptical fantasies. To see how, notice first that it is not part of this notion that the 
alternative theories would have seemed plausible to the scientists who had failed to 
conceive of them: Although special relativity seems plausible to us, it is unlikely that 
18th century physicists would have found it plausible, had they conceived of it 
(Magnus 2006; 2010, sec. 4).2 Stanford (2009a, 380−1) admits this, but he insists on 
calling such theories ‘plausible’ simply because they actually came to be accepted by 
                                                                                                                                            
usually attributed to Laudan (1981). For a detailed analysis of how the NI differs 
from the ‘old’ pessimistic induction, see Magnus (2010).  
2 Indeed, it has been argued that special relativity was not just implausible, but 
even inconceivable for these physicists (French 2011, sec. 2). 
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later scientific communities. But then, the critic continues, we should also regard 
some sceptical scenarios as ‘plausible’ in this sense. For example, we presently find 
the possibility that all our sensory impressions are generated by a giant computer 
simulation wildly implausible, in the same way as Newtonian physicists would have 
found relativity theory implausible. But if someone in the future discovered that the 
simulation scenario was actually true, then we would have to conclude that it had 
been a serious possibility all along, hence it should count as ‘plausible’ in Stanford’s 
sense (Magnus 2010, 810). If this were so, then Stanford’s cherished distinction 
between Cartesian fantasies and scientifically serious possibilities would collapse, 
and the realist could conclude that we need not worry about the PUA any more than 
about Cartesian scepticism. 
The problem with this objection is that it ignores the role of RTU in delimiting the 
scope of the PUA. The history of science shows that there were unconceived 
alternatives to past scientific theories and that they are plausible in the above-
mentioned sense of being accepted by a later scientific community. By contrast, the 
history of pondering on sceptical scenarios of the computer simulation type does not 
show any such development and therefore does not give us any reason to take these 
possibilities seriously. Therefore, the PUA is a distinctive challenge which should 
worry the scientific realist, quite apart from general sceptical considerations. 
2.2  The distinctness of unconceived alternatives 
The second way to attack the premise (RTU) is to deny that the alternative theories 
which past scientists failed to consider are in fact ‘radically distinct’ from the theories 
they did consider. If there is sufficient continuity across scientific theories over time, 
then the existence of unconceived alternatives is no longer a threat to realism, because 
these alternatives, although unconceived, can be expected to be relevantly similar to 
the theories at hand. The PUA is then no longer a reason to doubt that these theories 
are at least approximately or partially true. Since realists have employed similar 
strategies to counter the conventional pessimistic (meta-)induction, Stanford devotes 
two chapters (2006, chaps. 6 and 7) to criticizing such attempts.3 His central claim is 
that the appeal to continuity is vacuous, because the realist can only retrospectively 
identify those parts or aspects of earlier theories that were retained in later theories, 
and consequently, this strategy ‘allows us to trust only some of what current theories 
tell us about the natural world … while leaving us completely unable to be confident 
in our ability to discern just which parts of our theories actually constitute this 
privileged class of theoretical claims’ (2006, 153). 
In response, realists have insisted on our ability to identify the trustworthy parts 
not only of past theories, but also of our current theories. Our strategies for 
performing this difficult task may not yet be perfect, but there is no principled reason 
to think that it cannot be done (Psillos 2009, sec. 4.2). Furthermore, continuity 
between successive theories does not necessarily require that some parts of the earlier 
theory are explicitly retained in the later theory, it is sufficient that the earlier theory 
survives as a limiting case of the later theory (Enfield 2008). But in either of these 
cases, the claim that it is in principle possible to identify some aspects of current 
theories which are likely to survive future theory change does not go to the heart of 
Stanford’s challenge. A convincing response to his critique of previous realist 
                                                           
3 The fact that these realist strategies are equally effective against the (old) 
pessimistic induction as against the NI (if they are effective) has prompted 
Chakravartty (2008, 153) to call the NI ‘a novel red herring’. This verdict is 
justified as long as one is only concerned with this particular type of realist 
strategy. However, as Magnus (2010, sec. 5) points out, there are other realist 
strategies which are effective against the pessimistic induction, but not against 
the NI.  
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strategies must do more than simply assert that one can do better; it must show 
explicitly how one can do better. 
Several ways to do so have been proposed in the recent literature. One group of 
strategies seeks to identify those parts of theories which are in some sense responsible 
for their empirical successes, and claims that we can expect these to be retained in 
later theories. The focus here can be either on successful novel predictions (Saatsi 
2009) or on the comparative success of a theory relative to its predecessor (Harker 
2013). One problem for this approach is that the fixing of criteria for what is to count 
as genuine success leads to a dilemma, as Stanford (2009a, 384) points out: On the 
one hand, if the criteria are too strict, then much of contemporary science will be 
excluded from realist treatment. For example, exclusive concern with novel predictive 
success at the expense of explanatory success will result in antirealism about large 
parts of some scientific fields, such as geology or evolutionary biology. On the other 
hand, even a very restricted realism seems to be confronted with some 
counterexamples, such as Poisson’s spectacularly successful novel prediction of a 
bright spot at the centre of the shadow of a circular disc, which rested on an 
assumption later abandoned, namely the ether hypothesis. 
Another problem for this type of strategy is that it is often hard to tell which 
theoretical assumptions are really responsible for a particular empirical success. For 
illustration, consider the example of Rutherford’s atomic model, as discussed by 
Harker (2013). Rutherford’s model differed from Thomson’s previous model in two 
respects, by postulating (i) a positively charged nucleus and (ii) a uniformly 
distributed negative charge surrounding it. Harker (2013, 80) admits that Rutherford 
used both of these assumptions ‘for purposes of explaining the scattering results’, 
which constituted the main empirical success of his model compared to Thomson’s. 
But surely we would not want to be realists about assumption (ii), so we need to 
claim that only assumption (i) was responsible for the model’s success. The challenge 
then is to distinguish in a principled way between those theoretical postulates which 
were responsible for success and those which were not. Unfortunately, Harker’s 
observation that ‘by Rutherford’s own admission, [assumption (ii)] was an 
idealization and in no sense confirmed by the data’ (91) does not go beyond Psillos’s 
(1999, chap. 6) earlier attempts to base such a distinction on the scientists’ own 
judgments, which Stanford (2006, sec. 7.3) has shown to be unreliable (see also 
Chang 2003). 
A final proposal on how to identify trustworthy theory parts uses the notion of 
‘minimally interpreted mathematical parts’ of theories (Votsis 2011). The guiding 
idea is that mathematical structure is often preserved in theory change, and an 
appropriate interpretation of that structure might yield a realism capable of 
withstanding the PUA. However, much hinges on what exactly one means by 
‘minimal interpretation’ here. Votsis (2011, 1229) characterizes it as ‘the bare 
minimum that needs to be assumed in order for there to be an appropriate inferential 
relation’ from the equations to the empirical predictions. Without further 
qualification, this seems compatible with a strict instrumentalism, according to which 
theories are nothing more than useful tools for deriving empirical predictions. Hence, 
it is not immediately clear how the appeal to minimally interpreted mathematical 
parts of theories is supposed to support any kind of realism. At least, more needs to be 
said about what is to count as an appropriate minimal interpretation, a question to 
which I will return in subsection 3.2. 
2.3  The induction from past to present 
Having discussed several arguments against the premise (RTU), let us now consider 
the inductive step performed within (NI). The validity of such an inference from the 
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history of science to our present situation depends on the assumption that the present 
is relevantly similar to the past. This assumption can be challenged in various ways. 
First, if the evidence supporting our present best theories is qualitatively better 
than the evidence that supported our best theories in the past, then an induction from 
past to present theories might be problematic. In other words, while an induction of 
the (NI) type may count as some kind of second-order evidence against the truth of 
present theories, such evidence needs to be balanced against the first-order evidence 
we have in support of these theories (Psillos 2009, sec. 4.4), and this evidence is, in 
some cases at least, massively more impressive than the evidence for the theories on 
which Stanford bases his NI (Votsis 2007). However, as a general strategy against the 
NI, this idea faces the dilemma familiar from the previous subsection: If the standard 
of first-order evidence required for realism is set too high, then much of present 
science will fail to meet that standard; if it is too low, then many theories now 
considered false will meet the standard, and the NI will not be blocked. 
Furthermore, pointing to differences between past and present theories is not a 
sufficient response to the NI, because the NI is, as Stanford (2006, sec. 2.3) 
emphasizes, an induction over theorists rather than theories. The second way of 
criticizing the NI takes this fact into account and argues that present scientists differ 
relevantly from past scientists, due to improvements in scientific methodology 
(Roush 2010, Devitt 2011). It seems clear that there is indeed such a difference 
between the past and the present. What is less clear is whether the difference in 
scientific methodology bears on how well scientists are equipped to deal with the 
PUA.4 If improvements in methodology just lead to more empirical success, but not 
to a better grasp of the space of alternative theories, then present theorists do not 
differ relevantly from past theorists, as far as the PUA is concerned. 
Finally, one might argue that Stanford’s induction from past to present can be 
blocked even if it is agreed that present theorists are, individually, not relevantly 
different from past theorists. This is because the scientific community is simply much 
larger now than it was in the past (Fahrbach 2011), and because later scientists have 
had more time for their increasingly robust scientific traditions to uncover alternatives 
(Ruhmkorff 2011). But notice that these developments have been accompanied by 
other developments that might well have the opposite effect: It is at least plausible 
that the contemporary mechanisms of research funding lead to a decrease in the 
investigation of fundamentally distinct alternatives to dominant theories (Stanford 
2006, 132). Therefore, although there is an undeniable difference between the 
scientific community in the present and the past, it is not self-evident that this 
difference undermines the NI. 
3  Causal Knowledge as a Criterion for the Realist 
As the discussion in subsection 2.2 has shown, the realist’s appeal to continuity 
across theory change as an argument against the PUA needs to be made precise in 
terms of a criterion that permits the identification of parts of theories which are likely 
to be retained in the future. Furthermore, this criterion must be applicable 
                                                           
4 While Devitt (2011) does not address this issue, because he thinks that the onus 
is on the antirealist to show that the past and the present are relevantly similar 
(290n11), Roush (2010, 55) explicitly connects improvements in methodology 
with the PUA. In support of the view that there is such a connection, she refers 
to her earlier treatment of Perrin’s work on the atomic hypothesis (Roush 2005, 
218-223). I will discuss this example in section 4, where we will see that her 
approach is, by itself, not sufficient to establish the immunity of the atomic 
hypothesis with respect to the PUA. 
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prospectively, that is, it must not depend on knowing which parts were in fact 
retained in later theories. Chakravartty (2008, 155) proposes ‘detailed causal 
knowledge’ as such a criterion, arguing that ‘if one has a detailed enough causal 
knowledge of something, knowledge that allows one to manipulate it in highly 
systematic ways, then there is no better warrant for knowledge’. This suggestion 
alone would not go a long way towards rebutting (NI), since Stanford has already 
dealt with realist attempts to capitalize on causal considerations. But as I will now try 
to show, Chakravartty’s proposal has the resources to withstand Stanford’s criticisms. 
However, his account is rather sketchy, so it is necessary to look at the relevant 
passages of Stanford (2006) in some detail, in order to see why Stanford’s criticism of 
earlier causal strategies invoked by realists does not apply to Chakravartty’s strategy. 
3.1  How Chakravartty’s proposal differs from earlier causal 
strategies 
Stanford (2006, sec. 6.3) discusses several realist attempts to argue for successful 
reference of theoretical terms despite changing theoretical descriptions associated 
with these terms. Of interest for our purpose is his critique of Psillos’s ‘causal-
descriptivist’ account of reference, which argues for referential continuity across 
theory change by allowing for changes in theoretical descriptions as long as they 
leave the ‘core causal description’ of a given entity intact. For example, Psillos (1999, 
286) claims that there is referential stability between nineteenth and twentieth century 
electrodynamics in that ‘the term “luminiferous ether” may be seen as referring to the 
electromagnetic field’, because ‘the core causal description associated with the term 
“electromagnetic field” takes up the core causal description associated with the term 
“ether” ’. Stanford’s (2006, 151) reply is as follows:  
Of course, this account of the matter invites the realist to choose the 
core causal descriptions she associates with the central terms of past 
theories rather carefully, with one eye on current theories’ claims about 
nature, so there is more than a whiff of ad hoc-ery about the proposal.  
And further:  
This case for the referential status of central terms in successful past 
theories simply invites from the historical record a renewed form of the 
pessimistic induction itself, this time concerning our ability to 
distinguish (at the time a theory is a going concern) which of our beliefs 
about an entity are actually part of its core causal description. (152)  
What Stanford has in mind here is the fact that past scientists have repeatedly 
included claims we would now consider utterly false in the core causal descriptions of 
their theoretical entities. As an example, he mentions Maxwell’s claim that the ether 
must be a material substance, because the energy transmitted by electromagnetic 
waves ‘cannot be contained in any vessel except the inmost substance of material 
things’ (Maxwell [1873] 1955, 493; quoted in Stanford 2006, 152). Generalizing from 
such examples in the spirit of the pessimistic induction, Stanford concludes that ‘we 
cannot rely on our own judgments about which of the descriptions we associate with 
our own terms are genuinely part of their own core causal descriptions’ (153). 
Returning now to Chakravartty’s proposal, it is tempting to identify what he calls 
‘detailed causal knowledge of something’ with Psillos’s ‘core causal description’ (of 
something) and, consequently, to suspect that Stanford’s critique is equally damaging 
to both of these proposals. But this impression is misleading, as can be seen by 
attending to another important aspect of Chakravartty’s position: his insistence that 
scientific realism is ‘first and foremost a realism about well-confirmed properties’ 
(2008, 155). On this view, continuity between successive theories is ensured not by 
their referring to the same entities, but the same properties. The difference between 
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the two accounts is quite subtle, because Psillos (1999, 293), too, emphasizes 
continuity at the level of properties. However, he identifies them as ‘properties by 
virtue of which [the posited entities] play their ascribed causal role’. This invites 
Stanford’s complaint that we may only be able to single out which properties these 
are with the benefit of hindsight. Taking again the above example, we nowadays 
know that the electromagnetic field can play its causal role without being a material 
substance, but as we have seen, Maxwell explicitly denied that this could be true of 
the ether, and Psillos does not give us a criterion on the basis of which Maxwell and 
his contemporaries could have thought otherwise.5 By contrast, Chakravartty’s 
identification of the properties to which realists should be committed makes no 
reference to the entities supposed to possess these properties. Realism, Chakravartty 
(2007, 47) argues, is primarily concerned with ‘causal properties one has managed to 
detect’ (‘detection properties’). On the other hand, realists should remain agnostic 
with regard to ‘any other putative properties attributed to particulars by theories’, 
which he calls ‘auxiliary properties’. The question of how to demarcate detection 
properties from auxiliary properties will be discussed in the next subsection. For the 
moment, I just note that one does not need to rely on retrospective judgement to 
perform that task. For example, I will argue that even at the time of Maxwell, 
physicists could have classified the amplitudes or frequencies of (what they took to 
be) ether waves as detection properties, while recognizing the ether’s materiality as 
an auxiliary property. If this is so, then Stanford’s argument against our ability to 
reliably fix the core causal descriptions of our theoretical entities does not translate 
into an argument against our ability to tell detection properties from auxiliary 
properties. 
This refinement of realism is also effective against a second objection raised by 
Stanford to the realist’s use of causal reasoning. Having criticized Philip Kitcher’s 
(1993, sec. 5.4; 2001, sec. 5) distinction between ‘working posits’ and 
‘presuppositional posits’, Stanford (2006, sec. 7.2) considers a possible improvement 
of this distinction on behalf of the realist, to the effect that realists might want to 
commit themselves to the existence of only those posits to which theories ascribe 
direct causal roles, treating other posits as merely presuppositional (or ‘idle’). He 
takes a dim view of this idea: 
Although perfectly natural, this suggestion seems to run afoul of any 
number of discarded theoretical posits that were ascribed direct causal 
roles in the production of phenomena by the successful explanatory 
practices of their respective theories. To such familiar examples as 
phlogiston and caloric fluid we’ve seen that we might fairly add 
Darwin’s gemmules, Galton’s stirp, and Weismann’s biophors. (Stanford 
2006, 172)  
A realist who has taken Chakravartty’s lesson to heart need not be embarrassed by 
Stanford’s list of theoretical entities which were once believed to play a causal role 
but were subsequently abandoned. As we have seen above, there may well be 
discontinuity on the level of entities, but continuity on the level of properties. Thus, a 
sophisticated realist does not need to (implausibly) deny that, for example, past 
theories indeed ascribed a direct causal role to caloric. And he can even admit that 
Hasok Chang (2003) has refuted Psillos’s (1999, 130) claim that ‘caloric’ was not a 
central term (see also Stanford 2006, 175-179). But he can maintain that the 
properties which were ascribed to caloric and which we now regard as mistaken were 
                                                           
5 When Psillos (1999, 139) discusses Maxwell’s ‘differentiated attitude towards 
the several parts of a theory in view of what evidence supports them’, he may 
have in mind something similar to the criterion I will discuss in the following. 
But his failure to state it explicitly (or to provide any other criterion) invites 
Stanford’s charge of rationalization post hoc.  
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just auxiliary properties, while a case can be made for the retention of some detection 
properties which appeared in the caloric theory, such as the specific heat of air (cp and 
cv). 
Chakravartty’s focus on properties instead of entities might make him vulnerable 
to another one of Stanford’s arguments. This new strategy, the objection goes, secures 
nothing more than a pyrrhic victory for the realist, since a realism which forfeits its 
commitment to theoretical entities, settling for the mere commitment to (some) 
properties, does no longer deserve to be called realism. However, the fact that 
properties are the primary focus of the realist’s response to (NI) does not imply that 
his commitment is limited to properties alone. Once the reality of certain properties is 
established, the realist can argue for the existence of entities, based on the fact that 
properties often cohere to form interesting units (Chakravartty 2007, 63-66). In some 
cases, the reality of some entities follows even more directly, as will be seen for the 
atomic hypothesis in section 4. 
3.2  Causal realism and the detection/auxiliary distinction 
The analysis so far has shown that Stanford’s arguments against the realist’s appeal to 
causal knowledge do not, by themselves, threaten Chakravartty’s proposal. On the 
other hand, it has also shown that the viability of this new causal strategy depends 
crucially on our ability to tell detection properties from auxiliary properties ‘at the 
time a theory is a going concern’, as Stanford puts it. This necessitates a closer look at 
Chakravartty’s (2007, 47–54) account of the demarcation between detection and 
auxiliary properties. Here is the gist of his suggestion: 
Detection properties are connected via causal processes to our 
instruments and other means of detection. One generally describes these 
processes in terms of mathematical equations that are or can be 
interpreted as describing the relations of properties. As I will attempt to 
show, one can thus identify detection properties as those that are required 
to give a minimal interpretation of these sorts of equations. (48)  
But, as discussed at the end of subsection 2.2, the problem with the notion of 
‘minimal interpretation’ is that the corresponding commitment depends crucially on 
which reading of ‘minimal’ is applied. Without further qualification, Chakravartty’s 
(2007, 48) advice to treat as auxiliary anything that ‘goes beyond what is minimally 
required to do the work of science: to make predictions, retrodictions, and so on’ just 
results in instrumentalism. To be of any use for the realist, ‘minimal interpretation’ 
thus needs to be read as ‘minimal realist interpretation’. Chakravartty makes this 
reading explicit in his discussion of Fresnel’s equations: ‘The existence of certain 
properties is minimally required to give a realist interpretation of these equations’ 
(49). Unfortunately, Chakravartty does not offer an explication of the appropriate 
(realist) understanding of minimality that does not itself depend on having already 
identified some properties as indispensable. This makes his claim that ‘one can [. . .] 
identify detection properties as those that are required to give a minimal 
interpretation’ somewhat misleading: It is not the case that we can approach the 
relevant equations equipped with a well-understood notion of ‘minimal interpretation’ 
in order to learn which of the properties described by them are detection properties. 
Rather, it seems to be the other way round: Only once we know which properties are 
detection properties are we in a position to give an appropriate minimal (realist) 
interpretation of the equations in question. 
This is not to say that Chakravartty’s characterization of detection properties is 
unilluminating, but its success does not depend on identifying them by means of a 
minimal interpretation. In fact, Chakravartty seems to elucidate both concepts 
(‘detection property’ and ‘minimal interpretation’) with the help of a prior notion of 
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‘causal connection’ or ‘causal contact’. Not only does he (as seen in the above 
quotation), characterize detection properties as the ones which are causally connected 
to our instruments, but he also summarizes his ‘recipe of the minimal interpretation’ 
as a commitment ‘only to structures with which one has forged some significant 
causal contact’ (54). Of course, this only pushes the problem one step back. In order 
to demarcate detection properties from auxiliary properties, we now have to know 
what counts as significant causal contact. 
At this point, Chakravartty’s account can profit from some other recent work in 
the development of scientific realism. What I have in mind is the distinction between 
causal and theoretical warrant, introduced by Mauricio Suárez (2008) and further 
developed by myself (2012) in the context of what I call ‘causal realism’. More 
precisely, I suggest that this distinction adequately captures and explicates the 
intuitions behind Chakravartty’s detection/auxiliary distinction. By providing such an 
explication, causal realism turns Chakravartty’s (2008) sketch into a robust strategy 
against Stanford’s NI. 
On my account of the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant, the 
former is generated by an inference to the best explanation if and only if the 
corresponding explanation fulfils three criteria, denoted by ‘non-redundancy’, 
‘material inference’, and ‘empirical adequacy’ (Egg 2012, 261). It is the second of 
these criteria which gives us a first hint at how causal warrant connects to the concept 
of a detection property: Material (as opposed to formal) inference is defined as the 
kind of inference ‘that results in ascribing to a concrete entity a property for which 
there is a well-defined notion of what it means to modify it’ (266). Having such a 
well-defined notion is crucial for establishing causal contact with a hypothesized 
property P, because in order to claim that some observed phenomenon causally 
depends on the presence of P, one must be able to specify what would have happened 
if P had not been present. The properties mentioned in the definition of material 
inference can therefore legitimately be called ‘detectable properties’ (265n), since 
they are the properties with which we can in principle establish some causal contact. 
But not every detectable property is a detection property. In other words, the 
possibility of establishing causal contact is not always actualized, since the criterion 
of material inference is not alone sufficient for causal warrant, but only in conjunction 
with the other two criteria, empirical adequacy and non-redundancy. If a hypothesis 
postulating a (detectable) property P turns out to be empirically inadequate, that is, if 
it implies incorrect statements about observable things and events, then there is 
obviously something wrong with the claim that P is connected via causal processes to 
our instruments and other means of detection. In that case, P is not a detection 
property and the corresponding hypothesis lacks causal warrant (267). Similarly, a 
hypothesis lacks causal warrant if it does not fulfil the requirement of non-
redundancy, that is, if there are other (scientifically respectable) hypotheses capable 
of explaining the relevant phenomena (261-263).6 A property P postulated by such a 
hypothesis is not a detection property, because if the phenomena can also be 
                                                           
6 The foregoing considerations concerning the ‘minimal interpretation’ may have 
raised the worry that the criterion of non-redundancy can never actually be 
fulfilled, because there is always the alternative to choose an instrumentalist 
interpretation of equations instead of a realist one, and both options allow us to 
make the same predictions, retrodictions etc. However, this is a kind of 
redundancy that is not a proper subject for the debate on scientific realism, 
because it is just as damaging to common sense realism as to scientific realism 
(see Stanford’s (2006, 13) comments on the ‘Craigian reduction’ of a theory). 
The restriction to ‘scientifically respectable’ hypotheses in the definition of non-
redundancy aims to exclude this kind of cases. 
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explained by an alternative hypothesis which does not make reference to P, then 
observing these phenomena does not amount to making causal contact with P. 
In sum, relying on the characterization of causal warrant in terms of the three 
above-mentioned criteria provides us with a straightforward way to distinguish 
detection properties from auxiliary properties: The former are simply those for which 
we have causal warrant. This matches very well with Chakravartty’s account: 
Material inference spells out a crucial precondition for what he calls ‘forging 
significant causal contact’, empirical adequacy captures his idea that detection 
properties allow us to make predictions, retrodictions and so on, and non-redundancy 
expresses the belief that these properties are indispensable to performing these tasks.  
However, Stanford’s challenge creates a problem for this characterization, 
because it threatens the applicability of the criterion of non-redundancy. To take the 
PUA seriously is to acknowledge that even if a certain hypothesis seems to be the 
only one which can account for some phenomena, we may not be justified in 
asserting that this is really so. As a consequence, if non-redundancy were understood 
in the strong sense of there being no other empirically adequate hypothesis at all 
(whether known or unknown), then we could never claim any causal warrant in cases 
in which the PUA is a matter of concern, because we could never justifiably claim 
that the requirement of non-redundancy has been met. Therefore, if causal realism is 
to do any work in solving the PUA, non-redundancy has to be understood in the 
weaker sense of there being no other known hypothesis that accounts for the 
phenomena. Distinguishing these two senses of non-redundancy allows us to 
reformulate Chakravartty’s claim that our knowledge of detection properties is 
immune to the PUA in the following way: Hypotheses that are causally warranted, 
which is to say that they conform to the criteria of non-redundancy (in the weak 
sense), material inference and empirical adequacy, are likely to be non-redundant in 
the strong sense. 
To see how this explication improves on Chakravartty’s proposal, let us return to 
the example of ether waves introduced in the previous subsection. The challenge is to 
show how one can recognize the amplitude of such a wave as a detection property 
and the substantiality of the corresponding medium as an auxiliary property, without 
yet knowing about the former’s retention and the latter’s rejection in the subsequent 
theory. Working with Chakravartty’s definition, it is not easy to see how this could be 
done, because there is a sense in which the ether’s substantiality is just as much 
‘connected via causal processes to our instruments’ as the amplitudes of ether waves. 
More precisely, if one presupposes Maxwell’s belief (quoted above) that no energy 
can be transferred without a substantial medium, then we actually detect the ether’s 
substantiality whenever we detect the energy of an electromagnetic wave. The reason 
why the ether’s substantiality should (unlike the amplitude of an ether wave) still not 
count as a detection property becomes clear once we turn to the concepts of causal 
realism, in particular the criterion of material inference. The criterion is certainly 
fulfilled in the case of a light wave’s amplitude, because there is a well-defined 
notion of what it means to modify that property. There are well-known experimental 
procedures for this, and even in cases where experimental intervention is not possible 
in practice, it is perfectly clear what it would mean to intervene on the amplitude of 
an electromagnetic wave. By contrast, no such procedures or well-defined notions 
exist in the case of the ether’s substantiality. Even if one accepts Maxwell’s 
presupposition connecting substantiality to the capacity for energy transfer, it is not 
clear what it would mean to intervene on that property, and hence, the corresponding 
hypothesis does not meet the requirement of material inference. If, on the other hand, 
one insists that there is a well-defined notion of modifying substantiality 
independently of the capacity for energy transfer (after all, we now know that energy 
transfer can occur with or without a substantial medium), then the possibility of an 
electromagnetic field without a substantial ether is no longer an unconceived 
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alternative but a known one, and hence, non-redundancy fails even in the weak sense 
mentioned above. In either case, it follows that there is no causal warrant for the 
ether’s substantiality, which therefore fails to be a detection property. 
This shows that, by drawing on the conceptual resources of causal realism, the 
distinction between detection properties and auxiliary properties can be made 
sufficiently precise to underlie a realism with the prospect of withstanding Stanford’s 
argument from unconceived alternatives. The extent to which this prospect is realized 
will depend on how well this account fits the historical record of scientific reasoning, 
hence the need for detailed case studies as the one presented in the next section. What 
has been shown so far is that none of the arguments by which Stanford attacked 
earlier versions of realism are effective against the causal strategy described in this 
section, such that there is (until further notice) no reason to worry about unconceived 
alternatives to causally warranted claims. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that 
Stanford’s arguments can be modified so as to demonstrate causal realism’s 
vulnerability to the PUA. The reason for this is that causal warrant is closely 
associated with causal explanations of experimental phenomena, rather than with 
fundamental theorizing. Now admittedly, it would not be correct to say that 
unconceived alternatives are only a problem for fundamental theorizing, not for 
explaining experimental results. Indeed, experimenters regularly grapple with 
questions such as the following: Have we taken into account all external influences 
on the apparatus?  Did nothing go wrong in the calibration process?  Is the signal 
more than just an artefact of our sophisticated data analysis?  In dealing with these 
questions, it sometimes happens that relevant alternative explanations of the 
phenomena are overlooked. But the historical record of these unconceived 
alternatives does not possess the right kind of structure to support Stanford’s NI. 
Unconceived alternatives appear here and there in the history of scientific 
experimentation, but there is nothing like the systematic pattern described in (RTU), 
and accordingly, there is no analogue to (NI) which could call into question the 
scientists’ ability to reliably identify the causes of experimental phenomena. 
4  Causal Realism, Unconceived Alternatives, and 
the Atomic Hypothesis 
The previous section ended with a claim about the history of experimental science, 
and such a claim can of course be disputed on historical grounds. In fact, Stanford 
(2009b) can be interpreted as doing just that. Discussing Jean Perrin’s experimental 
work on Brownian motion and the associated case for the existence of atoms and 
molecules, Stanford argues that Perrin’s experimental genius did not prevent him 
from being subject to the PUA. The present section will address this objection. 
Analyzing the case of Perrin will also allow me to connect the rather abstract 
considerations of the previous section with actual scientific practice. In particular, this 
historical example will illustrate three central elements of the causal realist’s response 
to the PUA: the distinction between detection and auxiliary properties, the difference 
between fundamental theorizing and the causal explanation of phenomena, and the 
inferential step from detection properties to the reality of unobservable entities. 
4.1  Perrin and the philosophers: some initial observations 
Brownian motion is an irregular movement of microscopic particles suspended in a 
fluid, discovered by the botanist Robert Brown in 1827. Perrin was by no means the 
first to interpret this phenomenon as an effect of the constant movement of the 
molecules which constitute the fluid, but there is a wide consensus that the 
unprecedented accuracy of his experiments on Brownian motion, carried out between 
1908 and 1911, played a crucial role in establishing that atoms and molecules actually 
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exist.7 However, there is considerable (and ongoing) disagreement about why Perrin’s 
work played such a crucial role. The proposed answer which concerns us here is the 
one given by Roush (2005), but before discussing this approach, some remarks about 
other philosophical treatments of this historical episode will help to set the stage. The 
philosophical literature on Perrin’s work is so comprehensive that I will not try to 
give a complete summary here. I merely wish to discuss the part of the debate which 
is most closely related to causal realism, namely the arguments surrounding Nancy 
Cartwright’s (1983, 82–85) and Wesley Salmon’s (1984, 213-227) reconstruction of 
Perrin’s reasoning in terms of a causal inference. The two accounts are not identical 
(Cartwright sees Perrin’s argument as an instance of a more general inference 
scheme, namely ‘inference to the most likely cause’, while Salmon focuses on the 
‘common cause’ structure of Perrin’s argument), but they are closely enough related 
to be treated together in the present context. The central idea in both treatments is that 
the atomic hypothesis causally explains a wide variety of very different physical 
phenomena and that it would be an incredible coincidence if it managed to do so 
without being true. Even though this approach has been widely criticized, it still 
seems essentially correct to me. I will therefore briefly address the different lines of 
criticism that have been directed against it. 
Deborah Mayo (1986) argues that Cartwright misses an important element when 
she takes Perrin to infer the reality of molecules from the remarkable agreement in the 
estimates for Avogadro’s number based on entirely different physical phenomena. 
Before making such an ‘argument from coincidence’, Perrin had to check what Mayo 
(1986, 49) calls ‘the experiment’s internal validity’, that is, the adequacy of the model 
underlying the empirical predictions tested in one particular experiment, regardless of 
its applicability to other phenomena. For the study of Brownian motion, this meant to 
demonstrate that the movement of a Brownian particle was indeed a random process, 
not depending on the movement of neighbouring particles. This is the same element 
of Perrin’s argumentative chain that Roush (2005) focuses on, and my discussion of 
Roush’s position will show that causal realism can readily accommodate this element. 
Indeed, it seems that Mayo herself does not actually consider Cartwright’s analysis as 
mistaken, but merely as incomplete (see also Mayo 1996, 216-217). 
A second line of criticism is that the causal inference which Cartwright and 
Salmon take to be the essence of Perrin’s reasoning can only assure that the 
phenomena in question have a (common) cause, but not what that cause is 
(Achinstein 2001, 250;8 Psillos 2011, 358n14). Stanford makes a similar remark in 
the context of Roush’s proposal, and my discussion of it in subsection 4.4 will show 
that causal realism provides a substantial (though not exhaustive) characterization of 
what the cause of Brownian motion is. 
Finally, it has been argued that Cartwright and Salmon cannot explain why 
Perrin’s work was such a decisive step in convincing the scientific community of the 
reality of atoms, since the results they take to be central seem to have been available 
well before Perrin took on the issue (Maddy 2007, 404; Psillos 2011, 358n14). As 
mentioned above, I accept that the argument from coincidence, which Cartwright and 
Salmon emphasize, needs to be complemented by Mayo’s insight about Perrin’s 
demonstration of the randomness of Brownian motion. Therefore, I concede Maddy’s 
and Psillos’s point to the extent that the Cartwright-Salmon account is not quite 
sufficient to fully appreciate the importance of Perrin’s work. On the other hand, the 
                                                           
7 It is not immediately clear whether Stanford (2009b) departs from this consensus 
or merely criticizes one particular way of characterizing Perrin’s achievement. I 
will return to this question in subsection 4.4. For explicit criticism of the 
consensus, see van Fraassen (2009), but also the response by Chalmers (2011).  
8 Interestingly, this criticism does not appear in Achinstein’s (2002) paper 
dedicated to Salmon’s argument.  
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alternative accounts put forth by Maddy and Psillos strike me as even less convincing 
explanations of Perrin’s historical importance. Maddy (2007, 406) observes that 
‘before Perrin’s successes, the case for the existence of atoms had hinged on 
aggregate behavior’ and claims that ‘Perrin’s accomplishment was to establish a link 
to [the] behavior of individual molecules’. But this last claim is not true in any but a 
very loose sense, given that a Brownian particle undergoes some 1021 collisions with 
molecules of the surrounding fluid per second (Chandrasekhar 1943, 23). Psillos 
(2011, sec. 3.3) reconstructs Perrin’s reasoning by means of a probabilistic argument, 
but it remains unclear why Perrin’s experiments should have been crucial for 
establishing any of the argument’s three premises. The first premise states that the 
likelihood ratio P(n=N|−AH)/P(n=N|AH) (where AH stands for the atomic hypothesis 
and n=N for the claim that the number of molecules in a mole is equal to Avogadro’s 
number N) is very small. This follows from Perrin’s theoretical model and does not 
depend on any of his experimental results. By contrast, the second premise does 
report an experimental result, namely that n=N is the case. But if, as Psillos claims, 
‘most of the ways to calculate Avogadro’s number were known (and they were in 
agreement) before Perrin brought them together in his books’ (358n14), then 
establishing this premise was not a new achievement. The same is true for the third 
premise, stating that P(AH) is ‘not very low’. According to Psillos, Perrin evaluated 
this prior probability ‘by eliminating several alternative potential explanations of 
Brownian movement’ (357), but clearly, others had done this before him (Nye 1972, 
21-28). 
4.2  Roush and Stanford on Perrin 
Building upon Mayo’s ideas, Roush takes the decisive element of Perrin’s research to 
be his demonstration that Brownian motion is completely random, exhibiting ‘no 
systematic effects, no dependencies or correlations between the motions of one 
particle and another or tendencies in the motion of a single particle’. Roush goes on to 
claim that, by demonstrating the complete randomness of Brownian motion, Perrin 
confirmed what she calls ‘the modest atomic hypothesis’, that is, the hypothesis ‘that 
there are atoms and molecules, understood merely as spatially discrete sub-
microscopic entities moving independently of each other, i.e., at random’ (Roush 
2005, 219). This is the claim that Stanford attacks in his (2009b) paper. 
The disagreement between Roush and Stanford is illuminating, because, from the 
perspective of causal realism, both of them are partly right, but also partly wrong 
about this case. Let us see why. Unsurprisingly, Stanford takes issue with Roush’s 
(2005, 219) claim that ‘there do not seem to be any hypotheses that could explain a 
random walk in the Brownian particles that are not included within this [modest] 
atomic hypothesis’. He cites two hypotheses as counterexamples, taken from Fine 
(1991, 91): Instead of being caused by molecular collisions, Brownian motion could 
be due to electrostatic forces among the particles themselves (in conjunction with 
exchange forces with the medium) or it could be uncaused, a manifestation of some 
fundamental randomness in nature. I do not think that the first example really 
supports Stanford’s argument, because any causal influence of electrostatic forces 
among the Brownian particles on their movement would result in some correlation 
between the movements of nearby particles, thus contradicting Perrin’s conclusion 
that Brownian motion is fully random.9 Since Stanford does not dispute that Perrin 
                                                           
9 Stanford (2009b, 260) anticipates this kind of argument and admits that ‘the bare 
appeal to “electrostatic forces” does not immediately or straightforwardly entail 
random motion of the Brownian particles’. He nevertheless deems such an 
entailment possible, depending on ‘the characteristics of the electrostatic forces 
and their interaction with the exchange medium’. The idea seems to be that the 
14 
indeed established this conclusion, Fine’s first example is of no use to him. By 
contrast, Fine’s second example does support Stanford’s argument by accounting for 
complete randomness in Brownian motion without relying on the atomic hypothesis. 
This shows that Roush is wrong when she equates Perrin’s demonstration of 
randomness with a confirmation of the atomic hypothesis.10 
Using the terminology introduced above, we can summarize the argumentative 
situation up to this point by saying that the randomness of Brownian motion became, 
thanks to Perrin, a detection property. And while I agree with Stanford that this does 
not yet establish the reality of atoms, I also agree with Roush that it was a significant 
achievement. Drawing on the resources of causal realism, it is even possible to 
explain precisely how Perrin managed to turn randomness from an auxiliary into a 
detection property. Among the three necessary criteria for such a transition (see 
subsection 3.2 above), non-redundancy is the least relevant to this case, for two 
reasons: First, the logical space of possibilities is rather simple here, ‘since the motion 
is either random or it is not’ (Roush 2005, 219; quoted approvingly in Stanford 
2009b, 257). Second, and more importantly, considerations of non-redundancy cannot 
even start before there is a clear notion of what it would mean for the system to have 
one or the other of the alternative properties. In other words, it needs to be established 
that the randomness hypothesis meets the criterion of material inference. Perrin did 
this by deriving precise quantitative expectations about the behaviour of Brownian 
particles from Einstein’s (1905) theory of Brownian motion, which depended 
crucially on the supposition that the motion is completely irregular (Mayo 1996, sec. 
7.4). The comparison of these predictions with the experimental results then showed 
that the randomness hypothesis also satisfied the criterion of empirical adequacy, 
whereas its negation was incompatible with experimental data. Taken together, these 
findings endow the hypothesis with causal warrant, which amounts to saying that 
randomness is a detection property. 
4.3  From Brownian motion to the reality of atoms 
Hence, the causal realist and Roush agree that detecting the randomness of Brownian 
motion was an important step in Perrin’s argument. Furthermore, due to the simplicity 
of the logical space of possibilities (either random or not), not even Stanford views 
                                                                                                                                            
electrostatic forces interact with the medium in such a way that they cancel out 
any correlation between the movements of nearby particles. However, the 
plausibility of such a model is undermined by Svedberg’s experiments of 1907, 
which showed that the electrostatic properties of the medium had no influence 
on the Brownian movement of the particles (Nye 1972, 124-125).  
10 To be fair, Roush does not completely equate the two claims. She considers the 
possibility that something other than the (modest) atomic hypothesis could 
explain a random distribution of the motion of Brownian particles, but dismisses 
this possibility on the basis of the following two-stage argument: First, she 
argues that even if we (generously) assign a prior probability of 0.5 to the 
totality of these unknown alternatives, we still end up with a posterior 
probability for the atomic hypothesis of ≥ 0.6, ‘better than more likely than not’. 
But surely a realist wants to claim significantly more than that. So Roush adds 
that the atomic hypothesis also explains several other phenomena, including 
those Perrin used to determine Avogadro’s number. These pieces of evidence, 
Roush concludes, ‘increase the probability that there are atoms above the 
minimum probability I have argued for here’ (Roush 2005, 221). Hence, Roush 
can only infer the reality of atoms from the randomness of Brownian motion by 
relying on the traditional argument from coincidence. I think this is the right way 
to go (see below), but it undermines her claim that measurement of Avogadro’s 
number is not needed to confirm the modest atomic hypothesis (218–219).  
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this part of Perrin’s claim as threatened by the possibility of unconceived alternatives. 
But how do we get from here to a robust (PUA-proof) realism about atoms? As a first 
step, let us take a more detailed look at Fine’s second hypothesis mentioned above, 
which I shall call the no-cause hypothesis. Stanford (2009b, 261) admits that it is not 
easy to see how the appeal to fundamental, uncaused randomness could plausibly 
recapture Perrin’s explanation for the vertical distribution of Brownian particles at 
equilibrium. Perrin (1910, 530) described this distribution quantitatively by means of 
the following equation:  
 
€ 
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3W log
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n =ϕ(Δ −δ)gh, 
where n0 and n denote the concentration of Brownian particles at two levels separated 
by a height h, W is the mean (translational) kinetic energy of the particles, φ their 
volume, Δ their density and δ the density of the fluid in which they are suspended. 
Now there is a sense in which Stanford here concedes more to the realist than he 
needs to. As Alan Chalmers (2011, 721) emphasizes, Perrin was able to derive the 
above formula assuming only random motion of the Brownian particles, Newtonian 
mechanics and some elementary statistics, but nothing about molecules or the kinetic 
theory. In this sense, the no-cause hypothesis can explain the (experimentally 
observed) exponential decrease of particle concentration as a function of height. What 
it cannot explain is the rate of this decrease, since it does not tell us anything about 
the particle energy W. Nor can W be measured, because the velocity of the Brownian 
particles changes much too quickly to permit a reliable measurement (Perrin 1910, 
528-529). In the absence of a constraint on W, there is no constraint on the value of 
n0/n either, so the no-cause hypothesis would also be compatible with a uniform 
vertical distribution of particles (n0/n→1) or with all the particles sinking to the 
bottom of the vessel (n0/n→∞).
11 
Assessing the shortcomings of the no-cause hypothesis in this way allows us to 
spell out precisely what we need to assume about the cause of Brownian motion in 
order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the experimental results. Following the 
analysis by Chalmers (2011, sec. 5), I suggest that not all parts of the kinetic theory 
are needed, but only two of its central elements. The first one is a special case of the 
equipartition theorem, namely the assumption that, in equilibrium, the molecules 
constituting the liquid in which the Brownian particles are suspended have the same 
mean (translational) kinetic energy w as the Brownian particles themselves: w=W. 
This does not yet constrain the value of W, until the energy of a molecule is linked to 
macroscopically accessible magnitudes. The second assumption does this by 
postulating a specific value for Avogadro’s number N, which connects w to the 
temperature T and the universal gas constant R via the equation w=3RT/2N (Perrin 
1910, 517). If N=6⋅1023 mol−1 is assumed, the calculated value for n0/n agrees with 
what is experimentally measured. Conversely, measurements of n0/n (and φ, Δ etc.) 
can now be used to determine the value of N with high accuracy. 
Of course, invoking the atomic hypothesis in the form of the two assumptions 
described here is not the only possible way to explain the vertical distribution of 
Brownian particles. Experimentation is a tricky business, and there is always the 
possibility that what the experimenter observes is not an effect of the natural 
processes he intended to study, but simply an artefact of the experimental setup. This 
is where the argument from coincidence, as emphasized by Cartwright and Salmon 
                                                           
11 This argument occupies a central position in Perrin (1910, 554), as Chalmers 
(2011, 726) points out.  
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(but also by Chalmers 2011, 724-726), becomes crucial. If studying the vertical 
distribution of Brownian particles were the only way to establish a link between 
Avogadro’s number and observable phenomena, there would be room for scepticism 
about the atomic hypothesis. But this is not the case. In fact, there are several 
different phenomena from which we can calculate N. It would be an incredible 
coincidence if each of these observations were an artefact, and yet all agreed about 
the value of N (Cartwright 1983, 84). 
The argument from coincidence thus allows us to rule out the artefact hypothesis 
as a reasonable explanation of the observed phenomena, just as the no-cause 
hypothesis was ruled out by the previously discussed argument. But this does not yet 
address Stanford’s worry about hitherto unconceived hypotheses. In order to do this, 
it remains to be shown that the atomic hypothesis belongs to a class of claims which 
is not threatened by the PUA, because it does not provide the basis for an induction of 
the form (NI). According to causal realism, this requires showing that the atomic 
hypothesis enjoys causal warrant. The foregoing discussion has already shown that it 
fulfils the criteria of empirical adequacy and (weak) non-redundancy, since it 
accurately predicts what is experimentally observed, while the known alternative 
hypotheses are unable to do so. The assessment with respect to material inference is 
less straightforward, because it is not immediately clear whether there is a sufficiently 
well-defined notion of what it means to modify the properties to which the atomic 
hypothesis refers. In particular, while it is easy to see what it means to modify the 
numerical value of N, one needs to specify what this means in terms of physical 
properties; a possible world in which the number of molecules in one mole of 
substance is N’ instead of N may be seen as a world which has exactly the same 
physics as our world, but in which people simply use another definition of ‘one 
mole’. In order to relate a change in N to a real change of physical properties, one 
needs to keep the definition of the mole fixed while modifying the value of N. This 
change then corresponds to a change in physical properties, namely the masses of all 
atoms, such that the number of atoms in 12 grams of pure carbon-12 is no longer 
6⋅1023, but something else.12 Of course, there is no way in which we could actually 
bring about such a change, but practicability is not part of what the criterion of 
material inference requires. It is sufficient that the relevant change is well-defined, 
and this is the case here. In sum, the atomic hypothesis meets all the criteria for causal 
warrant. 
The fact that the experiments on Brownian motion do not merely confirm some 
predictions of the kinetic theory in general, but lend causal warrant to some specific 
assumptions, is a crucial achievement of Perrin’s work (for a similar assessment, 
though not formulated in terms of causal warrant, see Chalmers 2011, 723). More 
specifically, it provides us with a concrete historical example of the contrast between 
fundamental theorizing and explaining experimental phenomena, which I emphasized 
at the end of section 3; the kinetic theory as a whole is a product of the former 
activity, but when we manage to direct the successes of its predictions to some 
specific assumptions, we engage in the latter. Since, by Stanford’s own admission, his 
NI applies only to fundamental theorizing, not to explaining experimental 
phenomena, there is no reason to expect any unconceived alternatives to the atomic 
hypothesis when it comes to explaining the results of Perrin’s experiments. And since 
                                                           
12 There is an additional subtlety here, because the definition of the mole, in virtue 
of the phrase ‘12 grams’, implicitly refers to atomic masses, if ‘gram’ is defined 
in terms of the mass of a material body (as it still is according to the 
International System of Units). ‘Keeping the definition of the mole fixed’ 
therefore requires that mass be defined in an independent way, e.g. in terms of 
Planck’s constant. 
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the known alternatives (notably the no-cause and the artefact hypothesis) were found 
wanting, the case for the reality of atoms and molecules is complete. 
4.4  What we know about atoms 
But even if the truth of the atomic hypothesis is now secured, the above attempt to 
dissociate it from (parts of) the kinetic theory might raise the worry that the 
hypothesis thereby becomes uninformative. Stanford expresses this worry concerning 
Roush’s modest atomic hypothesis, when she dissociates it from the idea of exact 
localization, ‘to accommodate the possibility, later discovered, that atoms exhibit the 
quantum mechanical property of not being fully localized’ (Roush 2005, 219). The 
subtleties of quantum non-locality do not matter here, what matters is just that an idea 
which at one time was associated with the atomic hypothesis (namely exact 
localization) later came to be separated from it, so we might think that the two ideas 
should always have been kept separate. Stanford (2009b, 262) comments:  
Such retrospective retelling of the story threatens to treat the modest 
atomic hypothesis simply as a placeholder or a bare name for whatever 
further inquiry ultimately decides about the causes of the phenomena that 
occasioned its introduction.  
But we have already seen that this criticism has no force against my account of the 
atomic hypothesis. Firstly, it should be clear by now that the distinction between what 
does and does not belong to a hypothesis, on the basis of what is and is not causally 
warranted, can be drawn without the benefit of hindsight, so there is nothing 
problematic about ‘retrospective retelling of the story’. Secondly, the atomic 
hypothesis, as construed above, is much more than a placeholder; it makes substantial 
claims about molecules, most notably, how many of them there are in a certain 
amount of substance. Finally, since N connects macroscopic with molecular 
magnitudes, the atomic hypothesis directly yields further information about 
molecules, for example concerning their masses or their approximate dimensions. 
This is not to say that the atomic hypothesis gives us exhaustive knowledge about 
atoms and molecules, but it definitely gives us more than a bare name. 
It is now time to finally address a question which I have already hinted at in 
footnote 7 above: Does Stanford really claim that we have insufficient evidence for 
the reality of atoms, or does he just argue that Roush’s account is insufficient to 
support such a realism?  His (2009b) paper can be interpreted as defending only the 
second claim, with which I obviously agree. However, the following passage (taken 
from a different paper) indicates that he also embraces the first claim:  
Are atoms and amoebae really on epistemological equal footing?  
Although we can point to a glowing blue dot in a suitably prepared 
photograph and say “see, that’s an atom,” virtually all of what we think 
we know about atoms comes from the role they play in a highly 
elaborate fundamental theory we have adopted because its empirical 
accomplishments are so much more impressive than those of any 
competing account we know of concerning the fine structure of matter. 
But quite a lot of what we know about amoebae (how fast they move, 
what they eat, how often they reproduce, etc.) does not come to us in this 
way, but in a variety of other ways by means of which we routinely 
gather knowledge about the world around us (even if this knowledge is 
also ultimately “theoretical” in character). (Stanford 2009a, 389)  
This suggests that, although Stanford advocates realism about amoebae (which 
distinguishes him from a constructive empiricist), he remains sceptical about atoms. I 
have argued in this section that taking into account Perrin’s complete argument 
(rather than just the part Roush focuses on) undermines such a sceptical position. But 
18 
even if we suppose that this argument fails and that Perrin did not succeed in 
rendering the atomic hypothesis immune to the threat of unconceived alternatives, I 
doubt that it is, a century after Perrin, still possible to coherently oppose realism about 
atoms on the basis of the PUA. The reason for this is that we today possess evidence 
for atoms which is much more obviously immune to the PUA than the kind of 
evidence Perrin could produce. Consider, for example, the famous experiment in 
which Donald Eigler and Erhard Schweizer (1990) used 35 xenon atoms to write 
‘IBM’ on a nickel surface. The point is not that we ‘see’ these atoms ‘in a suitably 
prepared photograph’, but that our ability to produce such pictures testifies to our 
knowledge about atoms (how they behave when placed on a metallic surface, how 
they can be moved from one place on the surface to another, etc.).13 And this 
knowledge does not come from a fundamental theory, but from what is experienced 
in the laboratory. In fact, Eigler and Schweizer (1990, 525) admit that they have only 
an incomplete theoretical understanding of the interaction between the xenon atoms 
and the nickel surface or between the xenon atoms and the tip of their scanning 
tunnelling microscope, but this did not stop them from knowing how to position the 
atoms. To put it another way, the claim that Eigler and Schweizer really manipulated 
single atoms and that these really have the properties which make such manipulation 
possible does not depend on any eliminative inference. Rather, these claims are of the 
same kind as the ones Stanford cites with regard to amoebae, for which the PUA has 
no relevancy whatsoever. 
5  Conclusion 
Stanford’s PUA poses a serious challenge to scientific realism, a challenge which has 
not yet been fully answered by realists. In particular, different versions of selective 
realism, in their attempt to show that certain parts or aspects of scientific theories are 
immune to the PUA, have not succeeded in reliably characterizing these parts, or they 
managed to do so only with the benefit of hindsight. 
This paper has sought to develop a more successful type of selective realism. The 
starting point of my strategy was Chakravartty’s suggestion that causal knowledge is 
a kind of scientific knowledge which is not threatened by the PUA. I showed that this 
suggestion does not fall prey to Stanford’s criticism of similar earlier realist 
proposals, if Chakravartty’s distinction between detection properties and auxiliary 
properties can be explicated in a sufficiently precise way. This I attempted to do by 
bringing in the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant advocated by 
Suárez and myself. 
Since the criteria defining causal warrant are rather demanding, one might worry 
that not many scientific claims will meet this high epistemic standard. Consequently, 
the causal realism which derives from this strategy might seem so meagre as to be 
barely distinguishable from Stanford’s epistemic instrumentalism. The case study on 
Perrin furnishes at least the beginning of an answer to that worry, by displaying a 
clear case of how the causal realist’s commitment goes beyond what Stanford would 
allow. Furthermore, this case illustrates how the concepts and distinctions on which 
my strategy rests can be applied to concrete scientific practice. More work is needed 
to show that causal realism also yields substantive commitments in other cases,14 but 
at the very least, the present paper demonstrates that the limits of warranted realist 
belief are not as narrow as Stanford supposes. 
                                                           
13 This is obviously an instance of Hacking’s (1983) argument from 
manipulability. Several authors have pointed out shortcomings of Hacking’s 
general position, but these do not prevent the argument from working perfectly 
well in the case discussed here.  
14 For one more example, see my (2012, sec. 4) case study on the neutrino.  
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